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ARGUMENT 
ONE ISOLATED INCIDENT DOES NOT RAISE TO THE LEVEL REQUIRED FOR 
CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION UNDER UTAH LAW 
Appellants have successfully fulfilled their obligation to muster the facts and respectfully 
argues that the facts of the case do not rise to the level required under Utah Law in order to 
substantiate a finding of constructive eviction. 
Appellants' brief set forth the evidence and facts that the court used to find that 
constructive eviction occurred in this case. Specifically the Appellants cited the Memorandum 
Decision of the trial court wherein the activity in October 2002 as the basis for constructively 
evicting the Appellee. (Memorandum Decision at page 4-6 and Appellants' brief at page 9). 
Appellants argue that taking all the findings of fact made by the court in favor of the 
Appellee, that non-exclusive, disputed parking spaces, the calling of the police to the October 
2002, fiesta, the accusation of underage drinking and the disputed racial slur used by one of the 
Appellants' agents, that this is still insufficient to find a case of Constructive Eviction under Utah 
Case law. The trial court in its Memorandum Decision states that" Weighing this letter, 
explaining the nature of the fiesta, against a telephone call from a tenant speculating that there 
might be underage drinking at the fiesta (a tenant with whom the defendant had had prior 
problems regarding parking) suggests to the Court that it was not reasonable for the landlord to 
call the police to report underage drinking of alcohol and ask for a police investigation of the 
activity. Indeed, this suggests to the Court that there may have been some malice, which further 
indicates to the Court that, indeed, there may have been some hurtful comments made by the 
property manager during her telephone conversation with Sonia Madrigal." (Memorandum 
4 
Decision at page 6 and Finding of Fact number 14). The standard for a constructive eviction is 
not the reasonable nature of the facts but does the act deprive the tenant of his beneficial 
enjoyment of the premises. The trial court by using an unreasonableness standard failed to 
follow Utah law, misapplied the standard as set forth in Utah law and must its decision must be 
overturned. 
Appellee argues that the Constructive Eviction cases in the State of Utah are not 
completely on point and would like the court to look to outside jurisdictions to support the 
findings of the trial court. However, the case law cited by the Appellee not only is non-binding 
on the court, it is not Utah Law, but also focuses on the breach of the covenant of quiet 
enjoyment which was not the basis of the finding of the trial court instead it was constructive 
eviction which is why Appellants cited the controlling Utah cases. Furthermore the Utah cases 
show that there has to be something substantial not just a one time incident, such as was the case 
here where the parties disagreed over a party thrown by the Appellee. 
Taking the facts of the case and applying them to the Utah case law a finding of 
constructive eviction was improper. 
Constructive eviction is a disturbance of the tenant's possession by the landlord, or 
someone acting under his authority, which renders the premises unfit for occupancy for the 
purposes demised. The landlord's interference must be of such a substantial nature and so 
injurious to the tenant as to deprive the tenant of his beneficial enjoyment of the premises. 
Thirteen & Washington St. Corp. v. Nelsen. 254 P.2d 847, 850 (Utah 1953). 
A prerequisite to a showing of constructive eviction is that the tenant's right of possession 
and enjoyment of the leased premises must be interfered with by the landlord so as to render the 
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premises, or a part thereof, unsuitable for the purposes intended. Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 
647 (Utah 1982). The whole point of constructive eviction is that the landlord basically drove 
the tenant out through the landlord's action or inaction. Kenvon v. Regan 826 P.2d 140,142 
(Utah CtApp. 1992). 
Appellee argues that Appellants only cited one case when setting out the prerequisites to a 
finding of constructive eviction, in an effort to resolve and issue, Appellants, set forth the proper 
citations herein in support of the failure of the trial court to follow Utah law. First, a tenant's 
right of possession and enjoyment of the leased premises must be interfered with by the landlord 
so as to render the premises, or a part thereof, unsuitable for the purposes intended. Brugger v. 
Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982) Second, the offended tenant must show that the 
premises were rendered substantially unsuitable by an act or omission of the landlord. Kenvon v. 
Regan 826 P.2d 140,142 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) Third, the tenant must have provided the 
landlord with adequate notice of the alleged defects and allowed the landlord a reasonable 
amount of time to remedy the defects before moving out. Brugger v. FonotL 645 P.2d 647,648 
(Utah 1982) Fourth, the tenant must abandon the premises within a reasonable time after the 
interference begins. Brugger v. FonotL 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982) A prerequisite to a 
showing of constructive eviction is that the tenant's right of possession and use of the leased 
premises must be interfered with by the landlord so as to render the premises, or a part thereof, 
unsuitable for the purposes intended. Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982) (See 
also Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law, §5.05(d), pages 216-218). 
In the instant case the court cited the activity in October 2002 as the basis for 
constructively evicting the Appellee. Specifically, that the agents of Appellant called a police 
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officer to check on a fiesta being held at the premises to check for underage drinking. The trial 
judge put the question as this "If the property manager has made some racial epithets, racial slurs, 
racial comments, and even if they did ask the police to check out this party, does that constitute 
constructive eviction?" (Record at page 235) 
This single incident cannot be seen as one of a "substantial nature" so as to cause injury 
to the Appellee or to deprive it of its beneficial enjoyment of the premises. The premises were 
used as a school, the party was held on a Saturday, both inside and outside in the parking lot, the 
police officer did not shut down the premises or take any action nor was any action taken by the 
Appellants to stop the Appellee from continuing with the school on the premises. 
Utah case law does not support the conclusion that an owner or its agents cannot rely 
upon information from co-tenants to call the police to investigate an alleged crime, e.g., underage 
drinking. If this decision stands then the rights of the owners of rental property are hindered 
from protecting their property. To find that a visit from a police officer was enough to justify 
constructive eviction would further erode the rights of property owners and their ability to look 
after their property. 
The cases cited by the Appellee from other jurisdictions are not persuasive in this matter. 
The cases are related to findings of a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and do not 
involve one isolated incident and do not address constructive eviction. 
Mauro v. Division of Housing and Community Renewal 309 A.D. 2d 678 (N.Y.S.2003) 
wherein the decision was not based solely on verbal abuse but had found that the landlord had 
abused his tenants to a degree which rises to a level higher than that in this case, i.e., a policeman 
attending a party to check on underage drinking, and one phone call with a disputed racial 
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remark. 
Johnson v. Northpointe Apartments 744 So.2d 899 (Ala. 1999) wherein the landlord 
threatened arrest of the tenant which deprived the tenant of access to the premises 
Gillineham v. Goldstone 197 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1959) the conduct of the landlord had to 
reach a level that was "grossly insulting and threatening in character," which did not happen in 
the instant case. 
Chapman v. Brokaw 588 N.E.2d 462 (111. App.1992) wherein the landlord "pounded on 
their door, harassed them by phone, circled the property in their car, and wrongfully served them 
with a notice to quit the premises." Nothing the Appellants did in this case rises to this level. 
Nikzad v. P&H Investments, Inc., 36 Va Cir. 132 (1995) wherein the landlord intimidated 
the tenant, employees in attempts to provoke physical confrontation, threw merchandise on the 
street which resulted in loss of business. Appellee cannot show any loss of business as the 
premises were vacated within one week of the party thrown by the Appellee. Furthermore 
neither appellant nor its agents were involved in any confrontation with the Appellee other than 
this one isolated incident. 
Manzaro v. McCann 519 N.E.2d 1337 (Mass. 1988) wherein an alarm was going off for a 
full day and was not repaired by the landlord after notification cannot equal the isolated incident 
involved in the instant case. 
Tenn-Tex Properties v. Brownell -Electro. Inc. 778 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. 1989) wherein 
over a period of time the landlord and tenant relationship eroded and unfair demands were made 
culminating in a demand for full payment of rent for breach of contract. No demands were made 
on the Appellee for payment until after it vacated the premises, and other than the isolated 
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incident between the parties, no evidence was presented of any problems between the parties. 
Lanin v. Thurcon Properties. Ltd.. 197 A.D.2d 423 (NY App 1993) wherein the premises 
were flooded on two different occasions within a one week period and the landlord took no 
action to repair the flooding from the first incident, which again cannot relate to the instant case 
as this was of such a substantial nature and the facts surrounding the instant case pale in 
comparison. 
Al-Ziab v. Mourgis 679 N.E.2d 528 wherein the court was interpreting a Massachusetts 
quiet enjoyment statute requiring the landlord to act reasonably in the circumstances concerning a 
problem to the landlord. In the instant case the Appellants did act reasonably in protection of 
their property and other than the isolated incident, no evidence was presented to show a pattern 
of inactivity of the Appellants. 
Glvco v. Schultz 29 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio 1972) wherein the landlord allowed a third party 
farmer enter the premises and till the land was held to be an "obvious breach of the covenant of 
quiet enjoyment." Nothing in the facts of the case before this court case can rise to the level of 
conduct by the landlord in this case. 
Branish v. NHP Property Management. Inc.. 694 A.2d 1106 (Penn 1997) the tenant was 
deprived from inviting persons to her apartment. The premises in the case before the court was a 
school and no acts by the Appellants or their agents stopped any person from attending school, 
the fiesta was held during non school hours. 
None of the above cited cases by the Appellee have an isolated one time incident as is 
before this court wherein all facts were focused on the Appellees party held in October 2002. 
The trial court properly disregarded the argument of the Appellee regarding the parking spaces as 
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a factor in this matter as there is a nonexclusive parking clause in the lease. (Memorandum 
decision page3-4) 
Appellee in its brief goes to great lengths to sway this court with the use of both the 
nationality and religious belief of its agents Dr. Madrigal and his wife. Other than the one 
incident testified to by Mrs. Madrigal, and disputed by Appellants' agent, no other evidence was 
submitted to the court where a racial slur was used toward any person involved with the 
Appellee. Furthermore, Appellee states that the appearance by the officer caused fear and terror 
in those who attended the fiesta, a statement which is not supported by the testimony of the 
investigating officer. The officer made a quick and thorough investigation, found no crime being 
committed and left, (see the record at pages 165-167) The alleged racial slurs were alleged by 
Mrs. Madrigal in one phone call with Brenda Bellamy, which was disputed by Mrs. Bellamy. 
(Record at pages 175-177,185-187). The testimony read into the record from the police officer's 
deposition did not evidence any "scaring or intimidating" (record at pages 165-166) as was stated 
in Appellee's brief (Appellee's brief at page 26). 
The allegations that somehow the Appellee's agents, Dr. Madrigal and his wife were 
offended that other persons could be drinking as the Madrigals are members of the LDS Church 
and he is a BYU professor, cannot be a precedent this court can impose upon the public at large. 
If the Court upholds the decision of the trial court a precedent would be set that any time a 
member of the LDSChurch is accused of allowing the consumption of alcohol by a landlord then 
they are justified in walking away from their lease. The opposite would also be true if a member 
of another religion was accused of being a member of the LDS faith or abstaining from alcohol 
then they could walk away from a lease. This is illogical and should be disregarded as an 
10 
emotional plea and not a factor in a constructive eviction case. The impact upon property owners 
if the court were to uphold the decision of the trial court in the case would be extremely negative. 
Constructive Eviction of tenants could now be based upon emotion and not the elements set forth 
in prior Utah case law. 
Furthermore, if the trial court's decision is upheld, Property owners can no longer take 
rational steps to protect their property. The main element of the trial court in finding constructive 
eviction was the calling of a police officer to walk through the premises, which according to the 
testimony of the officer was done in a respectful and nonthreatening manner, (record at pages 
165-166) 
In fact the trial judge put the question as this "If the property manager has made some 
racial epithets, racial slurs, racial comments, and even if they did ask the police to check out this 
party, does that constitute constructive eviction?" (Record at page 234 -235) 
The Appellants respectfully submit that the facts of the case do not reach the standard set 
by prior Utah case law for constructive eviction and the trial court erred in ruling that it did. 
Such a ruling would deprive property owners of their rights to protect their property or sue for 
unpaid rents and would allow tenants the ability to create situations wherein they could claim 
constructive eviction and abandon the premises. This Court must reverse the trial court's 
decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court relied upon insufficient evidence to find that the Appellee was-
constructively evicted. The single incident which occurred in this case does not reach the 
standard set forth in Utah law for constructive eviction. Nor is it the standard one of 
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unreasonableness as to the actions of the Landlord. However the standard is are the acts of the 
landlord of such a substantial nature as to deprive the tenant from its use of the premises. When 
the proper standard is applied constructive eviction is improper in this case. 
The trial court committed reversible error in finding that the actions of the agents of 
Appellants was unreasonable and that it was the intent of the Appellants to evict the Appellee as 
required by Utah Law. The trial court also erred using the Appellee's agents Dr. Madrigal's 
religion, ethnicity and where he worked as a factor in this matter. 
Therefore the Appellants request that this Court reverse the decision of the trial court with 
regard to constructive eviction and direct the trial court to enter a judgment against the Appellee 
for unpaid rent. 
Respectfully submitted this 3 - day of January, 2006. 
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CARVEL R.SHA*FEf 
Attorney for Appellants 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS M. GRAY, ] 
] 
Plaintiffs, ] • Trial Court Case 
] No. 020915159 
Vs. ] 
] Appellate Court Casa| 
OXFORD WORLDWIDE GROUP, INC. ] No. 2003 0665 
] 
Defendant. ] 
January 5, 2005, 10:02 a.m. 
Third District Court 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL 
District Court Judge 
Ttggy L Qrovtr 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
11541 S. Hidden Valley Blvd. 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
(801)571-5206 
Page 165 
MR. QUESENBERRY: This is the deposition of 
David Bahde, I believe that's how you pronounce it. On 
the top of page 4, I began questioning. I asked: 
"Who did you work for on October 12th? 
He said: "I worked for the Salt Lake Police 
Department as a patrol sergeant." 
He has been-- On line 6 and line 7, he has 
been with the Salt Lake City Police Department for 
approximately six years. 
I asked: "Do you remember responding to a 
call, I believe it was on the evening of October 12th, 
2002 regarding underage drinking?" 
He answered: "I do." 
And then down on line 15, he states: "We had 
a loud party call." And line 17, "But since we were busy 
I responded to the area. I kept an eye on it for a 
minute or two to see what the party was and so I didn't 
see anything that was disturbing, I could handle the 
call myself." 
On the next page, page 5, starting on line 
13, I asked: "So you approached the party?" 
His answer is: "Yes. I drove up, parked in 
the parking lot, walked to the address in question, 
walked in the front door and looked for someone who was 
responsible." 
Page 166 
Line 20. "What was the response you got?" 
His answer: "I met with-- a Hispanic 
gentleman made contact with me." 
Line 25: I asked him: "What generally were 
the type of people that were at the party? What was 
their appearance; age, how did they look?" 
On Page 6 his answer: "I mean-- I remember 
approaching children, juveniles, I don't know, seven or 
eight teenagers and a few adults." 
Down on line 21, I asked him, "What questions 
did you ask this individual who was in charge?" 
His answer on line 23. "I didn't-- I 
identified myself, told him I was here for a report of a 
loud party and juveniles drinking alcohol and can I 
check the area for those particular things?" 
And the next page, page 7, line 2 or line 
1. "I spoke with-- What was his response?" 
The officer's answer: 'Sure.' I looked in his 
office. There was kind of a room with a table and party 
favors and soda pop and cookies, and food and stuff 
around. I was able to walk through the entire facility. 
I never saw alcohol or juveniles consuming alcohol." 
Now, at the bottom of that page, line 25, I 
asked: "Were there any loud noises, or music, or 
anything like that?" 
Page 167 
1 I Line 2 of page 8, his response: "I don't 
2 recall. I don't know what was considered loud music. I 
3 don't actually recall if music was going on or not." 
4 Then line 18 he said, "I left. I cleared the 
5 case with no case, because there was no evidence of 
6 either juveniles drinking alcohol or what I considered 
7 to be a loud party." 
8 On page page 9, line 16, I asked him, "What 
9 kind of beverages did you observe the people consuming?" 
10 His response was: "My recollection is soda 
11 pop of different varieties and the typical stuff at a 
12 party. Cookies." 
13 And then finally on page 10, line 24, I asked 
14 him, "And you didn't see any alcohol containers on the 
15 premises?" 
16 His response on the top of page 11: "I don't 
17 recall seeing any." 
18 And those were the excerpts that I wanted to 
19 read. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. 
21 Shaffer, are there any excerpts you would like to put on 
22 the record? 
23 MR. SHAFFER: Well, Your Honor, I would just--
24 I never did order a copy of this and I didn't get a copy 
25 of it, but in the-- in his testimony, I mean on 
Page 175 
A. The purpose of it is just to make the 
festival nice because we believe in the-- in the 
Columbus Day. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But the thing is when you are telling me that 
I contacted her is because I mentioned myself and I told 
the secretary: "Can you please explain to her that we 
want-- I want to talk with her because I want to ask her 
permission." 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then before but my husband, he already 
told me the radio flyer was supposed to be. 
Q. So some time before the party on the 12th? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Did Mrs. Bellamy call you? 
A. I think she find out with this, with the 
flyers, and she called me. 
Q. What did she say to you on the phone? 
A. She told me that, "Why do we going to go 
ahead without any permission?" By that time I think 
that my husband, he already called the California, the 
owner. 
Q. Right. 
A. And then he explained to him and I think that 
we had already permission from everyone. However, I 
Page 176 
1 didn't want that she can be in charge, because she was 
2 in charge of the office or the building, so that she was 
3 not-- she wasn't the owner but she was in charge of it. 
4 So I told her to-- I-- she called me and she said, "Who 
5 gave you permission?" And I said, "Well, I think that we 
6 have all the permission and all the rights." Because we 
7 had been writing, I mean we had been asking permission 
8 to the owner and she gave it to us." 
9 And she said, "No. You are the Mexicans. You 
10 are all of the same. You are wetbacks. You are--" and so 
11 never in my life. Never. Never. Nobody is telling me 
12 like that. 
13 Q. Okay. Wait a minute. You just said a lot 
14 there. What did she say about Mexicans? 
15 A. Yeah. She said, "You are the Mexicans all the 
16 same. You are such a--" And she swore. I don't remember 
17 the word but she did. 
18 Q. All right. And what was--
19 A, So I hang up. Excuse me. I hang up. So I 
2 0 put-- I can't understand her voice and she yell at me, 
21 she shout at me, and what do I have to say? 
22 Q. Now, you said wetback. What did she say 
23 about wetbacks? 
24 A. Wetbacks. "You are grease, Mexican greases," 
2 5 and everything. She was just starting to denigrate us 
Page 1 
as Mexicans and she also told us that, "You will never 
going to be more up than us, than all of us. You think 
that you are the best but you aren!t. 
Q. Okay. And you say grease, greasy? 
A. Greasy and she said wetbacks. 
Q• Okay. 
A* She did. And I told her, "You don't know to 
who we are. You don't know to who you are talking with, 
but you will regret it." And then I hang up, very 
angry. 
Q. Was she yelling at you? 
A. Yes, she was yelling at me and very angry 
because we are going to do that, like harassing me. 
Q. How did that make you feel when she called 
you a wetback? 
A. Well, as you can see, I react very horrible 
because nobody has been telling me. You know, I try to 
do-- we are not the same Mexicans that she thought of 
us. Because we, my husband and I, we have been doing 
such a good job since we got married. We are Mexicans 
but different kind of Mexicans. We try-- we just don't 
been here only over here, we've been around in Europe 
and other places, even in England, because I went to--
he went to the school in England, I went to school in 
England. 
Page 185 
rights to do that? 
A. Exactly because this is our jurisdiction. 
MR. SHAFFER: That's all, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Quesenberry? 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Your Honor, I don't have 
any further questions for her. 
THE COURT: All right. You may step down. 
Thank you very much. Any other witnesses? 
MR. QUESENBERRY: None, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any rebuttal witnesses. 
MR. SHAFFER: Actually, I would like to call 
Mrs. Bellamy. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bellamy. Mr. 
Bellamy or Mrs. Bellamy?
 v 
MR. SHAFFER: Mrs. Bellamy first. 
BRENDA BELLAMY, 
resumed the witness stand. 
THE COURT: I would remind you you are still 
under oath. 
DIRECT-EXAMINATION 
Q. (By Mr. Shaffer) You have been in the 
courtroom room and heard the testimony of Dr. Madrigal 
and Mrs. Madrigal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. They have made certain allegations against 
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1 you. 
2 A. Yes, they have. 
3 Q. As far as the statement they've made, how do 
4 you respond to that? 
5 A. I'll say they are absolutely false and very 
6 hurtful because I am not prejudiced. 
7 Q. Have you ever called them the names that I 
8 won't repeat. 
9 A. Absolutely not. 
10 Q. Do you have any prujudice against Hispanics 
11 or any other--
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Against anybody? 
14 A. No, sir, none against anybody. 
15 Q. Do you have any relatives that are Hispanic? 
16 A. I do. 
17 Q- How close? 
18 A. Well, Spanish. I don't know how close that is 
19 but--
2 0 Q- Well, Hispanic. I am asking you how close a 
21 relative you have. 
22 A. A sister-in-law and nieces, nephews. 
23 Q. So you don't treat them any differently than 
24 you treat any other person, do you? 
25 MR. QUESENBERRY: Objection. Leading. 
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THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Absolutely not. I adore them. 
We're a very close family. 
Q. But as far Hispanic people themselves, or 
Mexican, or Spanish people themselves, you have no 
prejudice against them? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. When you-- Dr. Madrigal has indicated that 
you made certain statements to him regarding parking. 
A. I may have spoken to him once and I never 
said that, "You1re allowed four stalls in front of your 
space." He could have heard it from somebody else but 
never-- I am not authorized to tell people they have 
reserved stalls. I have to follow the lease and when it 
says non-exclusive I have to tell everybody 
non-exclusive and they have to try and get along. I did 
place a call to Mister-- the manager of Friends of MS, 
to ask them please to just work with each other and 
that's all I could do. I can't do anymore. It's not 
exclusive. I have nothing to enforce. 
Q. When you became aware of this party on 
October the 12th, and based on that, when did you become 
aware; do you remember? 
A. I was aware of it, it would have been the day 
I received this flyer. I received a call from--
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what we did was reasonable, it was prudent under the 
conditions. They were outside of the purview of their 
lease at that point, even though Tom Hollander said that 
they could have that party, what he told them, I don't 
know, but even at that, still there was nothing wrong 
with having the police go check them out and make sure 
there's nothing wrong. In his testimony he didn't go 
around and flash his badge. He was in uniform but he 
walked around. He didn't do anything other than just 
walk around and observe. So they were not evicted from 
the premises. We're entitled to rent, also the attorneys 
fees, as the lease calls for because they did breach 
their lease and we are entitled to damages. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. 
Quesenberry, you say that the fundamental issue in this 
case is who is telling the truth and it has been my 
experience that in almost every case that finally gets 
to trial there's always that issue of who is telling the 
truth, because there's different versions and different 
perceptions. But I think in this case there's an even 
more fundamental question first, before I get to the 
question of who's telling the truth as to this telephone 
conversation, and so forth, and that is whether even if 
what you say is true, is that constructive eviction 
under Utah law? Even if the property manager has made 
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racial epithets, racial slurs, racial comments, and even 
if they did ask the police to check out this party, does 
that constitute constructive eviction? Is it denial of 
your use, quiet use and enjoyment of the property? So I 
think that's the first issue that the Court has to 
determine. 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Your Honor, would it be 
helpful if we were to brief that issue and get that— . 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to have to look at 
some cases to get a better feel for some of the quiet 
enjoyment issues. So I will be taking it under 
advisement for a few days to do that. If you want to do 
a brief brief, you are certainly welcome to do so, but 
you need to get it in right away, I don't want this to 
linger. So if you want to get one in within the next 
two or three days then you can file simultaneous briefs. 
I'm not interested in having a brief, and then a reply 
and then a response, and so forth, but if you want to 
file simultaneous briefs, let's say by Monday, then I'll 
rule on it Monday or Tuesday, or something like that. 
MR. SHAFFER: Will you do us a written--
THE COURT: I'll do a brief written opinion 
on it, yes. Okay. Thank you very much. We will be in 
recess. 
[Proceedings concluded at 3:56 p.m.] 
